The new Keynesian microfoundation of macroeconomics by Spahn, Heinz-Peter
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The New Keynesian Microfoundation of Macroeconomics 
 
Heinz-Peter Spahn 
 
Nr.317/2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 0930-8334 
The New Keynesian Microfoundation of Macroeconomics 
 
 
 
August 2009 
 
 
 
Abstract 
New Keynesian Macroeconomics (NKM) obeys to the new dogma that macroeconomics should be 
firmly grounded in First Principles of micro theory. Households are assumed to run an intertemporal 
optimization calculus with respect to leisure and consumption by making use of perfect financial mar-
kets. The supply side is organized so that full employment prevails. Macroeconomic coordination 
problems between saving and investment are absent. In order to make model predictions more com-
patible with empirical facts, NKM chooses "ad hoc" microfoundations: utility functions and market 
structures are designed arbitrarily to allow for persistence of macro variables. NKM's reduced hybrid 
macro model, with lags and expectational leads, is a useful "work horse", compatible with various mi-
cro reasoning. However, NKM's insistence on the representative agent obstructs an understanding of 
heterogeneous beliefs and learning.  
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"Macroeconomics is now firmly grounded in the 
principles of economic theory." 
Varadarajan V. Chari / Patrick J. Kehoe (2006: 3) 
 
"Modern macro is today an application of micro 
theory, no different in that respect from labor, IO, 
international, or public finance. [...] The creation of 
a micro-foundation for macro means that it is now 
an applied field, no longer central." 
Daniel S. Hamermesh (2008: 409) 
 
"If a person has a hammer, everything looks like a 
nail and if an economist has modern tools, then 
every issue looks like a chance to apply these 
tools." 
Mark Blaug (2001: 152) 
 
 
Introduction 
New Keynesian Macroeconomics (NKM) have replaced the venerable IS-LM model, but also 
the New Classical streamlining of monetarism. The economic profession thus has reached a 
"consensus model" that consists of a consumption function, depending on future expected in-
come and the real interest rate; a goods supply function, depending on expected future infla-
tion and the output gap; and an interest-rate reaction function on the part of the central bank, 
aiming to eliminate inflation and output gaps.1 The purported strength of NKM is its firm 
anchoring in micro decisions; competing theories that introduce macro variables without 
direct derivations from utility maximization are excluded from the Econ Tribe2 on account of 
using "ad hoc" theories without "proper microfoundations".  
 This paper argues that the methodological principles of NKM, which at first glance might 
appear as neutral with regard to its contents, provide a strong bias in the direction and sub-
stance of economic theory. Markets are depicted in a way that rules out the very kind of coor-
dination failures, which called for the invention of macroeconomic analysis in the 1930s. 
Stabilization policy has to tackle minor shocks in a regime of rigid prices, but financial 
markets are assumed to work perfectly. Besides the risk of misleading the economic-policy 
debate, further critical points can be raised: 
• NKM's insistence on microfoundations as an indispensable precondition of macro theory is 
                                                 
1 A useful representation of NKM on a textbook level is Carlin/Soskice (2006). 
2 A nice picture of this population of economic scientists once was given by Leijonhufvud (1981).    
2 
itself but an "ad hoc" axiom that cannot grant any scientific pre-eminence to NKM. 
• NKM's reference to microfoundations is opportunistic and hypocritical as suitably modi-
fied micro-theoretic elements are chosen afterwards, only to provide a better fit to the 
facts.  
• The presentation of microfoundations is a pointless exercise and hardly adds to a better 
understanding of macro processes. Economists from various camps can agree on hybrid 
reduced macro models with lags and expectational leads.  
• Whereas NKM's emphasis on the forward-looking character of private expectations has to 
be accepted without reservation, its basic components, namely the fictitious representative 
agent and his straightforward optimization calculcus, impede an access to the stabilization 
problem of heterogeneous beliefs.   
 
Roots of New Keynesian Theory 
Actually, Keynes is to blame for all the mess. He bequeathed to the profession a new kind of 
"macroeconomic" theory, derived from the interaction of goods and money markets, which 
leads to a quasi-equilibrium with some level of (un-) employment that, strangely enough, 
would basically not be modified by adding a labour market with flexible wages. After all, this 
was the result of the analysis in Chapter 19 of the "General Theory": changes of nominal 
wages in a state of unemployment induce adjustment processes with an uncertain overall sign. 
One is tempted to interpret effective wage rigidity as reflecting some kind of rational expecta-
tion on the part of workers with regard to the imponderability and futility of wage reduction 
in times of crisis.3 However, after Keynes, linking unemployment to flexible wages and prices 
appeared unthinkable for the majority of economists4, which inevitably made "Keynesian" 
theory a synonym for fix-price models. 
 Keynes's message was that essential First Principles of economic theory are suspended 
most of the time in a market system. Instead of reflecting fully-fledged optima, macro vari-
ables were forced to settle at second-best corner solutions. First of all, this holds for prefer-
                                                 
3 "Thus it is fortunate that the workers, though unconsciously, are instinctively more reasonable 
economists than the classical school, inasmuch as they resist reductions of money-wages" (Keynes 
1936: 14). 
4 "In the absence of wage rigidities one must [sic!] start from full employment, and then an increase 
in money cannot lead to an equilibrium at higher output" (Mayer 1984: 128). Apart from Tobin 
(1975) and Hahn (1977), few economists insisted on the possibility of involuntary unemployment 
in spite of flexible wages.  
3 
ence-based labour supply. For many people, weighing up consumption and leisure in a given 
period or in an intertemporal perspective is no relevant topic if the labour market is domi-
nated from the demand side. Another issue is the saving decision. Its importance is dimin-
ished, compared to the neoclassical model of intertemporal allocation, firstly because people 
are constrained to dispose of their life-time income. Secondly, in a monetary economy, a sav-
ing decision does not at all comprise a provision of finance for investment.5  
 All this does not mean that considerations on logic and motives of individual behaviour are 
absent in Keynes's work. According to a widespread saying, 70 % of the "General Theory" 
consists of micro theory (Kirman 2006): wage claims are viewed from the perspective of rela-
tive income distribution among wage earners; money demand and investment decisions are 
said to be strongly biased by subjective assessments of market uncertainty. But all these con-
siderations are more suitable to emphasize perceived market imperfections, than to pave the 
way to a full-employment equilibrium. Accordingly Keynesianism, as a theory of macro rela-
tions, was developed into an approach of demand management where political agencies act as 
benevolent representatives of individuals, because markets are incapable to transmit and 
process their preferences. 
 Since the 1960s, neoclassical monetarism attacked this state of affairs in two ways. Firstly, 
the starting point of economic-policy considerations tacitly was moved back to full employ-
ment: Friedman's "natural" rate of unemployment (and Keynesian policies were presented as 
if they aimed for over-employment). This was a remarkable, though less discussed, change of 
view because General Equilibrium Theory had not succeeded to prove the existence and sta-
bility of a full-employment equilibrium under non-Walrasian conditions, i.e. in a market 
transaction system not controlled by the Auctioneer.6 Secondly, given this new scenario, it 
was obvious to re-establish the supremacy of the individual agent. As market conditions now 
                                                 
5 "The ex ante saver has no cash, but it is cash which the ex ante investor requires. [...] For 'finance' 
is essentially a revolving fund. It employs no savings. [...] If there is no change in the liquidity po-
sition, the public can save ex ante and ex post and ex anything else until they are blue in the face, 
without alleviating the problem in the least – unless, indeed, the result of their effort is to lower the 
scale of activity to what it was before. This means that, in general, the banks hold the key position 
in the transition from a lower to a higher scale of activity. [...] There will be always exactly enough 
ex post saving to take up the ex post investment and so release the finance which the latter had been 
previously employing. The investment market can become congested through a shortage of cash. It 
can never be congested through a shortage of saving. This is the most fundamental of my conclu-
sions within this field" (Keynes 1937: 219, 222).  
6 Therefore Hahn (1980; 1982) never tired of accusing Friedman and New Classical Macroeconom-
ics of a lack of seriousness.  
4 
appeared better to comply with private interests, the troublemaker role was passed on to the 
state. Hence, the theory of stabilization policy focused on the task to defend individual wel-
fare against discretionary policy interventions, which were said to have benevolent intentions 
(possibly), but deplorable outcomes. In the early 1980s, this line of reasoning culminated in 
the theory of time inconsistency that proposed strong regulations to preclude central banks 
from following their alleged inclination to run a "surprise inflation".7   
 The following period was marked by a triad in macro theory: 
• New Classical Macroeconomics favoured market clearing and rational expectations, i.e. 
agents are assumed to know and to believe in a simple monetarist macro model, so that 
predictable policy changes would cause private responses (validating the Lucas Critique). 
Anticipated monetary impulses cease to have any real impact also in the short run. 
• The Theory of Real Business Cycles considered monetary and credit aggregates as en-
dogenous and of limited importance, and propagated the influential image of intertempo-
rally optimizing agents who adapt their paths of employment and consumption to an end-
less sequence of real shocks; booms and recessions appear as processes in equilibrium that 
do not need any economic policy control.8  
• Opposed to these two paradigms, Neo Keynesian contributions emphasized that wage and 
price setting deviate from the ideal of perfect flexibility for various reasons that are well 
understood from a microeconomic point of view (menu costs, fairness, hysteresis etc.). 
With rigid prices, monetary policy remains powerful also in a neoclassical macro model.  
Taylor's (1993) discovery of an interest-rate reaction function, which allowed to grasp the be-
haviour of many central banks, paved the way for a synthesis of the three aforementioned 
paradigms: New Keynesian Macroeconomics9 lends itself to an analytical background for the 
new consensus in the theory of monetary policy, according to which the main instrument of 
                                                 
7 Although awarded the Nobel Prize, this approach was assessed to be a "non-problem in the real 
word" and "absolute nonsense" on the part of highly-ranked economists with practical central-bank 
experience (Blinder 1997: 13; Goodhart 2003: 45).   
8 Thus, the Great Depression of the 1930s is viewed as a minor deviation from the Steady State, and, 
in case of the UK, is described as the labour-supply function merely shifting to the left (for a cri-
tique see Pensieroso 2007). Temin (2008: 684) accuses this example of Real Business Cycle theory 
of suffering from epistemological incompetence, ignorance and inconsistency: "Actors in models 
have rational expectations, but the economists formulating the rational-expectations models [...] do 
not. They do not make use of all available knowledge, ignoring the research of economists and 
economic historians [...]. They also do not make use of the underlying history." 
9 The notion "New Neoclassical Synthesis" (Goodfriend 2002) would give a better fit to the basic 
ideas, but it is not often used.  
5 
central banking is not the quantity of money, but rather the (short term) rate of interest. At 
first sight, the interest-rate reaction function of the new model emphasizes the practical con-
tent of NKM; but the more fundamental reason for presenting central-bank behaviour as 
changing interest rates, and not quantities of monetary aggregates, is to be found in the neo-
classical intertemporal core of NKM. Its basic model does not even contain a quantity of 
money in any meaningful sense. Market agents react to (relative) price signals, i.e. the real 
rate of interest, which can be controlled by the central bank, provided that there is some rigid-
ity of inflation. 
The theory of Real Business Cycles delivers the basis of NKM, because it embodies in a 
rigorous way the methodological norm, according to which a macro theory not only should be 
built from preference-based micro theory, but also should flow directly from an aggregation 
of individual acts of choice. Besides this axiom of microfoundation, forward-looking expecta-
tions give the second constituent of NKM; this serves to grasp, in a precise analytical form, 
agents' responses to suspected actions of economic-policy institutions. The third element is 
some nominal price rigidity, which is necessary to preclude that shocks and central-bank in-
terventions do not go beyond mere price effects.  
 These three components create an image of an economy, which is characterized by a repre-
sentative household performing an optimization calculus that integrates labour supply, con-
sumption demand and portfolio choice.10 Minor exogenous shocks, emanating from Mother 
Nature's throwing a dice, are benevolently stabilized by a central bank that is endowed with 
the private agents' true preferences. But running any autonomous policy strategies leaves no 
traces in the economy, because this is neutralized by appropriate responses on the part of pri-
vate agents who are assumed to be in equilibrium beforehand.11 Two features of this scenario 
that are praised also by central banks' staffs give cause for concern: 
• "One prime characteristic of such models is the rigorous consideration of the principle that 
                                                 
10 Macroeconomics is deduced "from a model in which a single immortal consumer-worker-owner 
maximizes a perfectly conventional time-additive utility function over an infinite horizon, under 
perfect foresight or rational expectations, and in an institutional and technological environment that 
favors universal price-taking behavior. [...] Basically this is the Ramsey model transformed from a 
normative account of socially optimal growth into a positive story that is supposed to describe day-
to-day behavior in a modern industrial capitalist economy. It is taken as an advantage that the same 
model applies in the short run, the long run, and every run with no awkward shifting of gears" (So-
low 2008: 243). 
11 "In an intertemporal equilibrium, the effects of most expected demand-based policy wash out as in-
dividuals adjust their actions to take expected policy into account" (Colander 2006: 6).  
6 
the development of the economy as a whole is the result of the actions of its individual de-
cision-makers" (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008: 33). Yes, but what has become of the for-
merly-taught wisdom that a specific branch of macro economics is needed because the per-
formance of an economy cannot be explained alone by looking at, and adding up, individ-
ual choices? 
• "A second major characteristic of DSGE [Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium] mod-
els is the coherent formulation of the interaction between the individual decision-makers 
and the economy as a whole" (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008: 34). Yes, but if the market sys-
tem is conceived of as coherent interaction of individual choices, does that rule out the 
emergence of involuntary behaviour by assumption? 
Strangely enough, this kind of "macro" modelling nowadays serves to calculate, neatly after 
starting with the European and US representative agent's utility function, the welfare effects 
of a co-operation of ECB and Fed, precisely up to several decimal places... (Adjemian et al. 
2008) 
 
The Fundamentalist Breaching of the Gap between Micro and Macro 
NKM has not been "discovered", and particularly not by means of testing empirical hypothe-
ses. It has been constructed, in order to reach preferred research targets by making use of se-
lected theoretical components. This becomes clear by regarding the element of Calvo Pricing 
that provides an elegant way of formalizing the desired result of inflation rigidity: Calvo's 
(1983) model more or less had remained unnoticed for many years, but then it became help-
ful. Stating the "fabrication" of NKM, however, in no way means to raise a critique; all essen-
tial contributions to the history of economic thought were made by putting up a paradigm (in 
rivalry to others). Concomitant theoretical controversies generally cannot be settled by econo-
metric exercises: observations often are compatible with several competing analytical views; 
moreover, alternative paradigms often exhibit a different conceptional architecture and give 
qualitatively different predicates.12  
                                                 
12 "In economics the model is the formal core of a paradigm. [...] Compared to a research practise of 
putting up and testing empirical hypotheses, the analysis of models allows an explication of the 
normative essence of economic reasoning. [...] The pioneering steps in the history of economic 
thought as the foundations of mercantilist, neoclassical or Keynesian theory, and also the corre-
sponding research on detailed topics, do not rest on the falsification of some hypotheses, rather 
they flow from reflecting the socio-economic relevance of the models' premises. [...] The postulate 
of falsification therefore remained a mere verbalism without significant impact on the main lines of 
research" (Riese 1975: 38-9, 29, my translation; cf. Summers 1992).  
7 
 Internal consistency of a paradigm, i.e. the analytical compatibility of its components and 
their correspondence with its key principles of discovering knowledge, thus is more important 
than its external consistency, i.e. the correspondence of single hypotheses with the data. "Un-
der this view, a model that is internally inconsistent is simply incorrect (and should be re-
jected), while a model that is externally inconsistent can be tolerated, at least until a better 
model is found." Wren-Lewis (2007: 49) states this principle, however, with a critical inten-
tion; he complains about the "imperialistic" practise of NKM adherents, who now represent 
the mainstream of economics, to exclude contributions from further debate, which differ in 
contents, style and jargon from the currently fashionable story of the optimizing agent. Par-
ticularly younger fellows of the scientific community, behaving like Iranian custodians of 
revolution, are said to keep an eye on the desired "purity" of published papers in the Journals' 
review procedures. Already in the early 1990s, Blanchard (1992: 126) criticized "the quasi-
religious insistence on micro foundations", by which adherents of competing theories were 
branded as heretics.  
Wren-Lewis (2007) and Blanchard (2008a) point to the striking similarities of the structure 
of NKM papers, in which well-known model equations pedantically are derived from First 
Principles although this has been carried out times before in already published work. Perhaps 
this is useful for checking the papers' internal consistency more easily; but probably Solow's 
presumption of an obsessive conformism captures the core of the matter.13 This has a strong 
resemblance to the uniform pattern of Marxist papers in the 1970s where even studies tack-
ling practical questions were to be built from a Hegel-like spiel of deriving the categories 
commodity, labour, capital, exploitation etc., in order to prove the writer's affiliation to one of 
the various left-wing scientific camps.  
 The new fundamentalism calls for a substantial consistency and methodological equiva-
lence of different types of economic models (Woodford 2008a): labour supply and portfolio 
choice, business cycles and growth, production and trade etc. At first sight, this imperative 
                                                 
13 "Something is being put over on us, by ourselves. Why do so many of those research papers begin 
with a bow to the Ramsey model and cling to the basic outline? [...] The bow to the Ramsey model 
is like wearing the school colors or singing the Notre Dame fight song: a harmless way of provid-
ing some apparent intellectual unity, and maybe even a minimal commonality of approach. That 
seems hardly worthy of grown-ups, especially because there is always a danger that some of the in-
group come to believe the slogans, and it distorts their work. [...] There has always been a purist 
streak in economics that wants everything to follow neatly from greed, rationality, and equilibrium, 
with no ifs, ands, or buts. [...] The theory is neat, learnable, not terribly difficult, but just technical 
enough to feel like 'science'" (Solow 2008: 244-5). 
8 
appears reasonable (particularly for any layman). In post-classical history of economic 
thought however, two schisms had come up:  
• The method of analysis can be partial or general, i.e. consequences of individual decisions 
on the system of all markets (and corresponding repercussions on the individual agent) can 
be excluded or explicitly included.  
• The content of analysis can be a single topic within a household, firm or market, or may 
address the economy as a whole (micro vs. macro).  
 
The Two Schisms in Economics  
method partial general  
topic 
 n agents representative 
agent 
micro Marshall Walras Woodford 
macro C(Y) IS-LM   NKM 
 
Marshall focused on partial-equilibrium analysis and was very cautious when it came to draw 
conclusions for general equilibrium. Walras aimed at an image of interdependence between 
all agents, but the execution of this general-equilibrium analysis for a long time seemed to be 
an insoluble calculation task. With the Keynesian Revolution, functional relationships like the 
consumption function, built on simple behavioural assumptions, were taken as basic compo-
nents for a theory of macro equilibrium analysis. Hicks (1937) offered a Walrasian interpreta-
tion of the IS-LM model, emphasizing the consistent relations between the number of markets 
and endogenous variables.14 This helped to enhance the overall acceptance of this model, 
which was also used by monetarists and New Classicals. This in turn was irritating in the 
view of Hahn (1980a: 5), because the IS-LM model emphasizes current income and sup-
presses the individuals' intertemporal optimization. "Behind the IS-LM story there must be a 
                                                 
14 Taking up this bow to Walras, Clower later laid the foundations of his theory of rationing. If the 
Auctioneer is absent, transactions may occur at false, i.e. non-equilibrium, prices. As a conse-
quence, agents at the "long" side of markets suffer income losses that spread through the whole 
economy and may stabilize a low-employment equilibrium. However, this approach did not catch 
on because it failed to offer systematic reasons for price rigidities and to clarify the relationships 
between goods and asset markets. "If Clower wishes to buy Champaign, he is able to signal this to 
Champaign producers by buying on the basis of a consumer credit, which is paid off by increasing 
his labour effort afterwards" (Streißler 1983: 464, my translation).  
9 
non-Walrasian story of thwarted actions." 
 It is exactly at this junction where NKM takes great pains to derive goods demand from a 
fully-fledged model that shows the optimal distribution of individual life saving over time. 
The trick that allows to pass − or better: eliminate − the frontier between micro and macro 
consists in creating a representative agent, the actions of which coincide with market move-
ments. Whereas the variables in IS-LM depict an (average) group behaviour, with only vague 
hints to microeconomic decision foundations that also do not have to be uniform, the NKM 
model is consistent, simply because micro and macro levels coincide. This appears to be a 
remarkably elegant solution of the micro-macro schism, particularly as the recently suggested 
alternative of Agent Based Computational Economics, namely starting from empirical behav-
iour of all n individuals and working one's way through highly complex, non-linear math to-
wards the macroeconomy (Colander et al. 2008), does not look too attractive.  
 
The Economics of the Representative Ramsey Saver  
The architecture of NKM restores the supremacy of the "homo oeconomicus" that had been 
undermined during the interregnum of autonomous macro theory. Many critics, professional 
and others, had felt and expressed unease with regard to that famous figure before. Repeat-
edly it was argued that the assumption of strict rational utility maximization seemed to be at 
odds with other social-science findings about actual economic behaviour of human beings 
(Rothschild 1988). Recently, the new branch of experimental economic research has extended 
this critique by undertaking explorations into the field of "neuro economics" (i.e. studies of 
human brains during times of decision making). 
 The justification of this line of critique and the fruitfulness of these new research ap-
proaches is questionable. Their background is given by the premise that the subject of eco-
nomic science is the "economic behaviour of human beings". Maybe this is a misunderstand-
ing: economics is no behavioural science, but rather a discipline that studies the functioning 
of a specific social system, in which market laws determine the scope of individual actions 
and the movement of macro aggregates. Economics achieves its independence and demarca-
tion in opposition to sociology and psychology by endowing artificial agents, living within 
models, with a very simple utility function.15 The only task of the latter is to create sufficient 
                                                 
15 "The assumption that humans are driven by greed is a very simplifying assumption. But it works 
very well. For instance the symmetry of the substitution effects and the possibility of distinguishing 
the substitution effect from the income effect are interesting outcomes of the analysis. But it is true 
10 
energy of motion to make models "live" so that they can be compared with each other. If a 
particular phenomenon is to be explained, e.g. temporary occurrence of asset-price bubbles, it 
is the very research programme of economics, not to look for changes in the people's minds 
and preferences (although not denying that these may occur), but rather to explore changes in 
market conditions that let prices explode in specific circumstances. The mark of quality and 
the criterion of scientific progress is the models' ability to replicate patterns of economic ex-
perience by means of theoretical reasoning.  
 The standard reproach of modern neoclassical theory, raised against approaches that lack a 
"proper microfoundation", is that the latter employ mere "ad hoc" assumptions on the behav-
iour of market agents. Colander et al. (2008: 236) turn this reproach back against its creators: 
"Nothing could be more ad hoc than the standard microfoundations." The idea of utility 
maximization is a presupposed axiom, gained from introspection, but not from empirical re-
search. But it is precisely for this reason that the claim, propagated by Colander and many 
others, that novel behaviouristic findings ought to be used to modify these old axioms, 
clutches at thin air: non-empirical predicates cannot be countered by means of observed ex-
perience. To come to the point at issue: if actual consumption and saving behaviour fails to 
meet the predicted pattern of intertemporal optimization, i.e. reacts "too strong" in relation to 
current income (Akerlof 2007), this does not necessarily imply that individuals prefer a less 
rational allocation of their life-time income.16  
The crucial point however is: market conditions, which are presupposed in the model of in-
tertemporal choice, are not given in reality. Distributing consumption optimally over time de-
pends on the possibility of individuals to lend money on their permanent income, if temporary 
periods of low market income are to be bridged. Because this perfect financial market does 
not exist17, consumption behaviour necessarily depends strongly on current income. Consum-
                                                                                                                                                        
of course that we get a characterisation of human agency that is not descriptive of any particular 
person's behaviour. But it is a very good theory, because it is useful. I am not saying that this is 
what happens in the world. But I am saying that it is a very good assumption because it allows us to 
get on this job" (Hahn 2005; cf. Stigler/Becker 1977).  
16 A further example of alleged low rationality is the hypothesis of money illusion, which seems to 
follow from the fact that workers show less resistance to real-wage losses resulting from inflation, 
compared to the case of personal (nominal) wage reductions (at constant prices). But this does not 
prove any lack of rationality. In the second case, real-wage lowering is accompanied by a direct 
signal on the part of the employer that the worker and his peer group might interpret as a judge-
ment about the worker's individual qualification and performance; such a judgement impairs his 
personal welfare and his market position.  
17 "This assumption, of complete financial markets, lends itself admirably to the construction of solu-
11 
ers know that their future expected income is distorted by spells of unemployment, the occur-
rence of which is hard to predict though; these quantity constraints are important also for 
firms (Arrow 1978).  
Obviously, professional modern economics suffer from schizophrenia as in the field of fi-
nancial-market economics all these deviations from the utopian ideal market are well known 
(information asymmetries etc.), which are stubbornly ignored when it comes to talk about 
macroeconomics in NKM. The assumption of complete markets means that all agents' in-
tertemporal budget constraints always are satisfied, bankruptcies and insolvency are impossi-
ble. The NKM world is populated by agents "who never default. This latter (nonsensical) as-
sumption goes under the jargon term as the transversality condition. This makes all agents 
perfectly creditworthy. Over any horizon there is only one interest rate facing all agents, i.e. 
no risk premia. All transactions can be undertaken in capital markets; there is no role for 
banks. Since all IOUs are perfectly credit-worthy, there is no need for money" (Goodhart 
2008: 13). Basically, NKM designs a non-monetary economy.18 Asset prices are governed by 
fundamentals and − although drawing their market value from an infinite time horizon − are 
not prone to speculative manias and unfounded expectations, as if a "friendly auctioneer at the 
end of time" guarantees terminal boundary conditions. Buiter (2009) thus concludes that 
models with this features "are not models of decentralised market economies, but models of a 
centrally planned economy". Questions regarding financial instability cannot be answered 
within this models, they cannot even be asked.19  
                                                                                                                                                        
ble models with 'rigorous' micro-foundations of optimisation within a general equilibrium system. 
The problem, of course, is that the assumption has no connection with the real world" (Goodhart 
2007: 19). 
18 This conclusion also might be drawn from an inspection of Woodford's (2003) vision of a "cashless 
society" (McCallum 2005; Boianovsky/Trautwein 2006; Spahn 2009).   
19 Whereas Woodford (2008a) happily proclaims that policy makers refer to modern, i.e. micro-
founded NKM theory when explaining decisions, Buiter (2009) unveils that central banks during 
the recent turmoil could not find any useful support from highly-trained young economists. "The 
typical graduate macroeconomics and monetary economics training received at Anglo-American 
universities during the past 30 years or so, may have set back by decades serious investigations of 
aggregate economic behaviour and economic policy-relevant understanding. [...] Most mainstream 
macroeconomic theoretical innovations since the 1970s (the New Classical rational expectations 
[...] and the New Keynesian theorizing [...]) have turned out to be self-referential, inward-looking 
distractions at best. Research tended to be motivated by the internal logic, intellectual sunk capital 
and esthetic puzzles of established research programmes rather than by a powerful desire to under-
stand how the economy works − let alone how the economy works during times of stress and fi-
nancial instability." 
12 
 It has to be conceded that also IS-LM is a fair-weather model as it does not deal with de-
faults and bankruptcies; but it offered a simple way of analyzing the macro consequences of, 
say, an increased liquidity preference on the part of individual agents in times of financial 
stress by shifting the LM curve. In NKM, this cannot be simply replicated. The basic point is 
not that one has to work through all the corresponding microfoundations first, rather, it makes 
hardly any sense to model a spell of liquidity preference in the basic framework of the repre-
sentative-consumer economy. The preference for liquidity can only arise in an interactive 
transaction system with uncertain payment flows. The perception that decisons of other mar-
ket agents might impose constraints on one's own future room for manoeuvre leads to a − at 
times very volatile − demand for financial assets, including money, used as buffer stocks.20  
In its basic version, NKM does not reach a degree of complexity where liquidity problems 
occur: one all-embracing agent consumes a bundle of differentiated goods produced under 
conditions of monopolistic competition. Disregarding optimal Ramsey growth, net investment 
and net saving are zero in equilibrium. The per-period saving function shifts due to expecta-
tional or other shocks ( 'S S→  or 'S S→ ), causing excess supply or demand on the goods 
market (AB or CD, respectively). Central banks seek to compensate shock-induced by inter-
est-rate-induced changes of saving, aiming to keep 0S = . 
 
Goods Market and Saving in NKM 
S
Sr
S'
A
B
C
D
 
 
There is no finance involved in the process. Interest-rate policies work by changing incen-
tives. Often, the production function contains only labour input (Goodfriend 2002). Then the 
                                                 
20 "The knowledge that the outcome of individual action depends upon the actions taken by others 
and is by them has important repercussions on individual behavior itself. Individuals prepare in ad-
vance [by demanding liquid assets] for the likelihood of making forecasting errors and conse-
quently of making decisions later revealed as suboptimal" (Streißler 1977: 120). 
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NKM story can best be understood as picturing a "service" economy without capital, where 
output cannot be stored. In the limit, if the representative agent is conceived to consist of sin-
gles who share the same utility function, we arrive at a "no-trade system" where each individ-
ual owns its firm and consumes its own product; it is the world of Say's Law (Arestis/Sawyer 
2008). The economic problem left is the optimal reaction to minor shocks, but not to cope 
with large-scale coordination failures. "What makes macroeconomics a separate field of study 
is the complex properties of aggregate behavior that emerges from the interaction among sub-
jects. Since in a complex system aggregate behavior cannot be deduced from an analysis of 
individuals alone, representative-agent models fail to address the most basic questions of 
macroeconomics" (Colander et al. 2008: 236).  
 NKM faces an uncomfortable trade-off. On the one hand, General Equilibrium Theory has 
shown that preferences and behaviour of heterogeneous agents cannot simply be aggregated. 
Variances between individuals matter! The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu problem states that 
choices may not be transitive; the representative agent's ranking differs from individual rank-
ings; reactions to shock may be different (Streißler 1977; Kirman 1992). On the other hand, if 
people are assumed to be identical, NKM may keep the representative agent, but as a conse-
quence the model has no interaction of agents, no distribution problems, no asymmetric in-
formation and no meaningful stock market.21  
 The critique so far may appear as unfair as it neglects the various refinements that were 
proposed in order to develop and improve the basic model set-up. One line of research is to 
add "financial frictions". Canzoneri et al. (2008) let households finance a long-term consump-
tion good by way of periodical loans from banks, and attach liquidity premia to bank deposits 
and even government bonds; but simulation results are "remarkably similar" to Woodford's 
(2003) no-bank model. Cúrdia and Woodford (2008) introduce different types of households 
and consumption loans between them. Neither of these approaches however allows for any 
crucial income risk on the part of households, as it would arise from downgrading the market 
relevance of permanent income and from letting investment-saving imbalances determine cur-
rent income.22 Hence, these extensions of NKM − due to the Walrasian method − yield many 
                                                 
21 "I have no objection to the assumption, at least as a first approximation, that individual agents op-
timize as best they can. That does not imply − or even suggest − that the whole economy acts like a 
single optimizer under the simplest possible constraints. So in what sense is this 'dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium' model firmly grounded in the principles of economic theory?" (Solow 
2008: 244) 
22 Blanchard (2008b) resumes in a critical comment: Cúrdia and Woodford "focus on intermediation 
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precisely-looking results, as, e.g., the amount of labour time that households devote to the 
production of banking services (Goodfriend/McCallum 2007), but do not grasp the impact of 
bank credit on goods demand, market income and employment in a typical monetary econ-
omy. 
 
The Supply Side: Firms as the Households' Servants 
The model builders' intention to preserve the dominant market position of the representative 
household is also felt on the supply side of NKM. Here, the first question is how to explain a 
less-than-perfect flexibility of prices. "Nominal rigidities matter" (Blanchard 2008a: 5). In 
general, the debate on this issue serves to describe a market economy as a deviation from a 
hypothetical auction-type market order where prices adjust with infinite velocity − because 
the process of production is interrupted during auctions.  
The more natural alternative is to view production and consumption as a process in histori-
cal, instead of logical, time (Kahn 1977; Robinson 1980); then it appears likewise more natu-
ral that prices and, in particular, wages are kept fixed for certain time intervals, in order to re-
duce transaction costs and to render economic relations − for households, within firms and 
partial markets − more calculable. Nominal and real spheres of economic life cannot be disen-
tangled. Rigidity of wages and/or prices is endogenously determined and does not necessarily 
indicate inefficiency or market failure (Hahn 1980b; Solow 1980).  
 The key point is: there would have been lots of microeconomic reasons for sticking to the 
traditional approach in macro theory where nominal wages adjust periodically and prices are 
free to move in principle, but actually behave also sluggishly because unit labour costs are 
stable. With fixed nominal wages, firms adjust to changing market conditions by varying em-
ployment. This implies involuntary unemployment23 on the part of the single worker (al-
                                                                                                                                                        
between households, rather than between households and firms. Thus, a failure of intermediation 
makes some households consume more and work less, others consume less and work more. There 
is no direct effect on production. It is clear, however, that much intermediation is between house-
holds and firms. Suppose that production takes time, and firms need to borrow in order to buy in-
puts. Then less intermediation directly translates into less production. Or suppose, more conven-
tionally, that financial intermediation is between saving and investment. Then, less intermediation 
implies less investment today, and thus less production in the future. In both cases, we are not talk-
ing about the net outcome of distribution effects, but with a direct effect on production. Can these 
effects be large? I suspect they can be." 
23 One caveat should not go unnoticed: additional arguments (e.g. heterogeneous workers) are needed 
to make a variation of the number of employees a more efficient adjustment compared to a varia-
tion of working hours.  
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though his union voluntarily has signed the fixed-wage contract).  
 But such a state of affairs would have seriously undermined the alleged market position of 
the representative agent. What is the use of all these Euler Equations if agents cannot avoid 
being off their labour supply curve from time to time? If the optimization logic of the simulta-
neous choices between labour and leisure, on the one hand, and consumption today and to-
morrow, on the other, is to be maintained, a state of full employment should prevail. There-
fore nominal wages have to be assumed to be flexible, which leads to the "striking (and un-
pleasant) characteristic of the basic NK model [...] that there is no unemployment! Move-
ments take place along a labor supply curve" (Blanchard 2008a: 12). Accordingly, prices have 
to be assumed to move more sluggishly compared to nominal wages, so that the real wage 
varies positively with effective employment.24  
In case of a negative demand shock, the wage bill shrinks, but due to constant prices, profit 
per unit of output is increased. If the profit mark-up is interpreted as a tax driving a wedge be-
tween consumption prices and marginal costs, and between labour's marginal product and the 
real wage, it is easy to understand that a shock-induced higher mark-up causes consumption 
and labour supply to fall (Goodfriend 2002). Keeping in mind that firms are owned by the 
representative household, lower wage income is cushioned somewhat25 by distributed "taxes", 
i.e. profits − and thus the consequences of a demand shock appear tolerable because NKM 
generously ignores distributional issues.  
 The justification of assuming inflation rigidity is somewhat more subtle. A simple refer-
ence to menu costs surely would not have met the high-brow analytical standards of NKM. 
Instead, again a combination of Mother Nature and an optimization calculus (Calvo 1983) 
looks much more promising. The core idea, according to which ever-changing conditions of 
competition on the goods market open up opportunities for changing prices on a random ba-
sis, sounds convincing in itself. Firms calculate optimal prices, given the degree of competi-
tion and the strength of demand. But when setting prices, they have to take into account that 
prices cannot be changed in the future at will; one has to wait for the occurrence of a conven-
ient market opportunity − this is the Sticky Price theory of the NKM model.  
                                                 
24 The implicit full-employment assumption of NKM also sheds some light on its dubious welfare-
theoretic recommendations: "Social welfare functions tend to share the characteristic that inflation 
dominates the output gap in importance. However, this may not be surprising, given that nearly all 
micro-founded models ignore unemployment" (Wren-Lewis 2007: 52). 
25 With lower output, of course, the sign of the variation of total profits is uncertain. But profit in-
come undoubtedly act as a stabilizing factor.  
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A minor question comes up in the case of positive trend inflation. The literature says that 
"firms are not allowed to change their prices unless they receive a random 'price-change sig-
nal'. [...] Prices of firms that do not receive a price signal are indexed to last period’s inflation 
rate" (Smets/Wouters 2003: 1133; cf. Woodford 2008b). But even "indexing" also necessi-
tates to change a price on the market, which is not allowed by assumption. Why, given trend 
inflation of 3 %, should a firm be restricted to increase its price by 2 %, if that was calculated 
to be the optimal step? Also the general message of the model: changes in macro activity dur-
ing the cycle come about by firms being forced to adjust their profit margins, does not sound 
like a First Principle behaviour. After all, unfavourable conditions to change prices from the 
perspective of the goods market are as bad for profits as internal wage pressure; hence it is a 
decision to refrain from changing prices − it is not prohibited by Mother Nature.  
Therefore, it is questionable whether the Calvo constraint to adjust prices really is com-
patible with the general flavour of NKM. The new Phillips Curve shifts the reason of less-
than-perfect monetary neutrality simply into some unexplained market constraints on price 
setting, but fails to recognize that these are also endogenous. "It is clear [...] that such a re-
striction comes from outside the logic of the model. In a world where everybody understands 
the model and each other's rationality, agents would want to go immediately to the optimal 
plan using the optimal price. They would not want to accept such a restriction" (De Grauwe 
2008: 34; cf. Sims 2008). What is startling also, is the conspicuous contrast between the "di-
vine" character of the perfect financial market and the "realistic" description of the monopo-
listic goods market. There are also microfoundations available to have it the other way round. 
In other words: the choice of microfoundations in NKM is "ad hoc". "Adding some realistic 
frictions does not make it any more plausible that an observed economy is acting out the de-
sires of a single, consistent, forward-looking intelligence" (Solow 2008: 243).  
 
Calibrating NKM's Microfoundations: "The Stories We Tell..." 
Actually, there is a lot of persistence in output and inflation, which cannot easily be repro-
duced by NKM. The basic model is "wildly counterfactual" (Mankiw 2001) because it pre-
dicts a boom in times of disinflation.26 What is to be done if macro data unanimously show a 
                                                 
26 "The first two equations of the [NK] model are patently false (more obviously so than those in the 
more loosely specified IS-LM model)... The aggregate demand equation ignores the existence of 
investment, and relies on an intertemporal substitution effect in response to the interest rate, which 
is hard to detect in the data on consumers. The inflation equation implies a purely forward looking 
behavior of inflation, which again appears strongly at odds with the data" (Blanchard 2008a: 9; cf. 
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pattern that is not compatible with NKM's prediction? Fortunately, this lack of external com-
patibility can conveniently be overcome by adding further doses of appropriately-chosen mi-
crofoundations. Again, the choice of central-bank staff's wording unmasks an opportunistic 
dealing with First Principles: "The inclusion of various types of market frictions and inertia 
[...] have proved to be necessary [!] so that the empirically observed relationships and actual 
developments of the time series can be better replicated with the DSGE models. Lagged ad-
justments are especially necessary in order to be able to give a realistic description of the ob-
served behaviour of prices, consumption and investment" (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008: 35). 
In order to give some "deep" foundation of these lagged adjustments, an operation on the rep-
resentative agent's utility function turns out to be unavoidable: "It is assumed that households 
have a propensity not to let their consumption fluctuate too much after changes in income (the 
'habit persistence' hypothesis). This assumption ensures [!] that the comparatively low level of 
volatility in consumption observed in the empirical time series can be captured by the model" 
(ibid. 38).  
 This kind of argumentation illuminates that microfoundation in practical research boils 
down to attaching some appropriate preference-theoretic phrases ex post, aiming to enhance 
the scientific status of the model. Hence, the researcher does not simply allows for persistent 
demand shocks of whatever source, rather he assumes "that the preference shock [!] follows a 
first-order autoregressive process to represent the persistence in the data" (ibid. 37). With re-
spect to the necessity of any useful model to show persistence in its basic variables, two 
points should be made here. One is that critics feel uneasy about the high importance of per-
sistent shocks in NKM; they explain "too much" in an otherwise equilibrium-biased model. 
Fuhrer (2004) once resumed: it is like "adding epicycles to a dead model".  
The second point is that NKM fails to give hysteresis effects a more prominent status. This 
is astonishing because in the more elaborate versions of NKM, which include investment and 
the capital stock, it is evident that shocks and monetary-policy reactions, by their impact on 
the supply side, leave persistent and maybe also permanent traces in the path of the economy, 
which also changes the equilibrium real rate of interest.27 This recognition verifies that "pre-
sent policies may irreversibly alter the future" (Arrow 1978: 166; cf. Lavoie 2004), but em-
                                                                                                                                                        
Ball 2005).  
27 "The equilibrium rate of return under flexible prices is no longer a function solely of current and 
expected future disturbances, but depends as well upon the capital stock, which is now an endoge-
nous state variable (and so a function of past monetary policy [!], among other things, when prices 
are sticky" (Woodford 2003: 372; cf. Woodford 2008a). 
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phasizing that superneutrality of money is not given does not seem to correspond to the ideo-
logical outlook of NKM.  
The practise of adding appropriate microfoundations to a beforehand chosen set of macro 
equations finally lends support to the heretical idea that the quarrels about preferences and 
First Principles simply might be superfluous. There is no need to embark on knotty epistemo-
logical questions whether it is mandatory to "reduce" economic phenomena; and whether this 
reduction must be downwards (from macro to micro) or upwards (from micro to macro). It 
suffices to acknowledge that a majority of economists today is ready to agree on a three-
equation "work horse" macro model with lags and expectational leads. The "stories" that are 
told in order to depict this model differ, and so do the derivations undertaken to obtain it (and 
they may even be not existent28); but finally we end at the (empirical) question of giving num-
bers to the relative weights of these lags and leads. There are many reason for lags, e.g. trans-
action costs, learning, or slowly changing preferences; researchers should not be obliged to 
agree to a single one and to reproduce the utility-maximization exercise as an intro to each 
macro paper. The economics of research ought to obey to Occam's Razor: the principle to 
keep models as simple as possible (Streißler 1977; Krugman 2000; Blanchard 2008a).  
 
Rational Economists and Uninformed Agents? 
The consensus among economists also embraces the understanding that market agents build 
forward-looking expectations (that is what economics is all about), and this includes reactions 
to expected behaviour of policy institutions. Controversies revolve around the question how 
"rational" these expectations are. Any discussion of that issue should recall that, in a Walra-
sian-type General Equilibrium world, the only knowledge heterogeneous agents should have 
is the information about the vector of those prices that are relevant for their own individual 
economic plans. But after the dismissal of the Auctioneer, economic theory set out to transfer 
His all-embracing knowledge into the minds of individual market agents − at least, that was 
meant to be the criterion of rationality.  
In imperfect markets, much more than just price information is needed for building expec-
tations. A rational image of the economy implies and requires assumptions about how people 
                                                 
28 "Good science need not always be built up from solid microfoundations. Thermodynamics and 
chemistry, for example, have done pretty well without much micro theory. Boyle’s Law applies di-
rectly to aggregates, much like the marginal propensity to consume. And the microfoundations of 
medicine are often very poor; yet much of it works. Empirical regularities that are formulated and 
tested directly at the macro level do have a place in science" (Blinder 1987: 135). 
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think about markets and models. Using all relevant information does not generally suffice to 
yield neoclassical results; it is also necessary that individuals assume that others behave ac-
cordingly. But do people really understand the kind of market(s) they are acting in? Indeed, if 
the world is as simple as the basic New Classical model once depicted − an expectation-
enhanced Phillips Curve and the Quantity Equation − it is straightforward to claim that indi-
viduals quickly understand that inflation is pinned down by money growth and output does 
not diverge from the natural rate.  
 If the macro model is more complicated or, even worse, if competing models are available, 
the assumption that agents build "rational", i.e. model-consistent expectations, becomes am-
biguous. On cannot but confirm Woodford's (2008a) dictum that it is essential to model ex-
pectations as endogenous (otherwise the agents' behaviour would be separated from their 
thinking) − but endogenous to what view of the world? The NKM image of households and 
firms, all being endowed with NKM theorists' view, is as naive as the former idea in the ra-
tional-expectations debate that differing beliefs about the economy among individuals over 
time, in a competitive struggle of survival of the fittest, would converge to the "one and only" 
theory − which at that time was the New Classical paradigm.  
DSGE models make very strong assumptions about cognitive abilities of agents in under-
standing the underlying NKM model. The representative-agent model assumes a market order 
through choices of an omniscient agent. But the enduring debates about scientific fads and 
fashions in economics point to the fact that neither researchers nor agents might know the 
truth. "If we cannot assume that economists understand the economy, we cannot assume that 
agents understand the economy" (Colander 2006: 9; cf. Kirman 1992). To put it more moder-
ately: the topic of uncertainty now is a key ingredient in any modern theory of monetary pol-
icy; but if it is admitted that central banks suffer from model uncertainty, we cannot keep the 
assumption that individual agents have a correct image of the true laws of the market.  
In a critical review of the rational-expectations paradigm, Arrow (1978: 160) rightly cast 
doubt on its implicit hypothesis that "economic agents are required to be superior statisticians, 
capable of analyzing the future general equilibria of the economy". He also hinted to the fact 
that it is not a less-than-perfect mental ability of market agents as such, which might pose a 
problem; rather, the creation of expectations essentially is a decentralized process that does 
not lead to a homogenous stock of knowledge shared by all people. Therefore Arrow (1978: 
164-5) disagreed "with the widely accepted proposition that econometric models should have 
expectations consistent with them. [...] It is the essence of the decentralized economy that in-
dividuals have different information. [...] Each agent ought rationally to base his anticipations 
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on all the information at his disposal and this may include a great many facts and observations 
not available to others. [...] Thus the anticipations of the different economic agents are not 
only not based on the same general economic model but they should in general differ consid-
erably from each other."  
Only if one conceives of a market economy as being populated by a representative agent, 
homogenous expectations might appear as a reasonable idea. A market society however is not 
only characterized by a division of labour, but also by a division of knowledge. As Hayek 
wrote long ago, one of the main functions of markets is gathering and creating information 
that single men do not have.29 Models that stick to the fictitious representative agent rule out 
by assumption that people learn from each other and change their views in an evolutionary 
process of interaction. Beliefs are changing whenever new experience comes up, when indi-
viduals are confronted with new opinions, new market behaviour (shocks) or new policies. 
Finally, it is a myth that so-called "deep" parameters like time preference or market structures 
are invariant to policy moves.  
 Any theory of expectation that is set up to be incorporated into a macro model therefore 
should start with the twofold recognition that agents are heterogeneous with differing beliefs 
(Solow 2008) and that information-processing ability is scarce (Arrow 1978). Both items are 
jointly applied, e.g., in De Grauwe's (2008) model where two groups of agents, optimists and 
pessimists, employ simple rules of thumb to forecast inflation and output; these heuristics are 
adjusted according to their success in the past, making the weight of differing beliefs vary 
during the cycle, which emerges endogenously from the model's market forces.  
 In the Learning literature, market agents use more elaborate (econometric) ways of im-
proving their view of the market process. The aim of producing persistence in an otherwise 
standard NKM model can be achieved by allowing that agents suffer from parameter uncer-
tainty and continuously update their subjective estimate of function parameters by reacting to 
empirical evidence (Milani 2007). This route surely appears more convincing, compared to 
                                                 
29 "The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the 
fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concen-
trated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory 
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not 
merely a problem of how to allocate 'given' resources − if 'given' is taken to mean given to a single 
mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these 'data'. It is rather a problem of how to se-
cure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative im-
portance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of 
knowledge not given to anyone in its totality" (Hayek 1945: 519-20).  
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the above-mentioned exercise of introducing a habit-persistence hypothesis into the utility-
theoretic framework, because it works without doses of questionable economic "psychology". 
The drawback of the adaptive-expectations approach is that individuals mostly are assumed to 
know the structure of the correct model of the world.30  
 A more promising idea is propagated by the Sticky Information approach where firms and 
households, although endowed with plenty of economic data, do not share a common under-
standing of the market process. Agents have different probability distributions of states of the 
world, and they differ in their ability to process information flows. This should not be read as 
an excursion to behavioural economics: individuals are not characterized by "bounded ration-
ality", rather, they try to achieve decisions that are as rational as possible, but they are aware 
of various internal or external restrictions that preclude the attainment of "true knowledge".  
 It is important to notice that these limitations, at least in part, are endogenous. Agents filter 
data dependent of subjective wants; and they know that market signals cannot be observed 
without error. As a consequence, they choose the amount and direction of information-
gathering activities. This includes the phenomenon of "rational inattention": people do no 
longer pay attention to institutions that do a good job, or to variables that have not moved too 
much in the past (Sims 2003; 2008). The Sticky Information theory thus delivers, compared 
to the Sticky Price story, a more conclusive explanation of inflation persistence. There are no 
external restrictions to set optimal prices, rather, firms assess the performance of their former 
expectations of today's events before they decide to take on a new look on the overall market 
situation. Only news and shocks that exceed certain thresholds induce fundamental supply-
side adjustments. "For most people, it is easy to find out what the monetary authority is doing, 
but it is much harder to figure out what it means. [...] The real cost is the cost of thinking. [...] 
Because thinking is costly, people do it only once in a while and, at other times, continue with 
outdated plans" (Mankiw/Reis 2002: 1317).  
 
Concluding Remarks 
There can be no doubt that NKM presents an impressive and − at least at first glance − coher-
ent paradigm. Its strength is to embed a modern and easy-to-handle macro model in a micro-
economic "story", the intertemporal decision-making process of a representative agent, that 
constitutes a renowned component of economic theory for decades. It was no surprise that key 
                                                 
30 "The literature to date has usually taken as given is, first, that agents use least-squares learning to 
adapt their perceptions of the true economic structure, and second, that they know the correct linear 
or linearized form of the REE solution" (Tetlow/von zur Muehlen 2006: 13).  
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formal ingredients of NKM, namely optimization and rational expectations, met with disap-
proval on the part of those critics who never were ready to accept the "homo oeconomicus" as 
a personification of the economic-theory research programme, vis-à-vis other social sciences. 
Also, NKM is not to blame for giving a high ranking to the principle of internal consistency. 
However, the NKM model exhibits qualitative deviations from a typical monetary economy's 
empirical appearance to a degree that gives cause for concern. The general set-up rules out 
basic macroeconomic problems, namely the coordination between saving and investment and 
the independent status of household income, by assumption; consequently it is easy to declare 
macro theory redundant.   
 On a second and more closer look, it turns out that the demand and the supply side of 
NKM is inconsistent, in so far as the degree of "realism" in the design of asset and goods 
markets varies arbitrarily. Calvo's pricing algorithm was taken from the micro economists's 
store room for the only purpose to add some inflation rigidity to the model. Contrary to the 
facts, the burden of adjustment in the cycle is shifted to the firms' profit mark-up, for the only 
reason to maintain the autonomous status of households, as spells of involuntary unemploy-
ment would thwart the very core of NKM: the intertemporal choice of leisure and consump-
tion. Contrary to its own principles, NKM is guilty of "ad hoc" theorizing, as the modification 
of household preferences only serves to present an ostensibly "deep" reason for output persis-
tence.  
 NKM proponents fail to understand that there is no epistemological justification for impos-
ing the claim for a microfoundation of macroeconomics upon the profession. In a way, this 
debate is superfluous as many economists accept the NKM reduced macro model, particularly 
the hybrid versions including lags, which can be explained by a bulk of reasonable microeco-
nomic arguments. The particular choice of NKM's recommended microfoundation aims to 
force research activities into the Procrustean bed of a naive pure consumption economy. 
NKM pays a high price for insisting on this fundament, because the economics of the repre-
sentative agent obstruct the way to an understanding of the evolutionary process of knowl-
edge creation and expectation formation, growing out of an interactive and competitive learn-
ing process of heterogeneous individuals. After all, guiding differing beliefs in non-perfect 
markets seems to be one of the central banks' main challenges.  
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